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CASE NOTES

CONTRACTS-Consideration-Bilateral Contract-Unilateral Contract-Reliance.
Lefforge v. Rogers, 419 P. 2d 625 (Wyo. 1966).

Plaintiff entered into a written contract for the sale of
his automobile dealership to defendant. At the time of
execution of the written contract, the parties allegedly entered into a separate, oral agreement concerning plaintiff's
obligation to a sign company for the rental of certain signs
used in the operation of his business. The essence of the
alleged oral agreement was that defendant would assume
plaintiff's liability under the existing lease and negotiate
directly with the sign company for a new lease. Subsequent
to the purchase, defendant used three of the signs in question
and unsuccessfully negotiated with the sign company for a
more favorable leasing arrangement with respect to the
remaining two signs. In an action brought by the sign company against the plaintiff on the existing lease the company
recovered a judgment of nearly $4,000. In an attempt to
make himself whole, plaintiff brought the present action
against defendant for the breach of the alleged oral agreement. The trial court 'determined there existed a separate
oral contract concerning plaintiff's obligations to the sign
company and judgment was had for .plaintiff. The Wyoming
Supreme Court accepted the trial court's determination that
there existed a separate, oral contract covering the lease of the
signs but refused to enforce it. The court held that there
was no proof that the written contract of sale supplied the
requisite consideration for the oral contract, or that there
existed any other consideration to support the oral agreement.
The court's decision in the principal case was based on
an express finding that the written contract failed to constitute consideration for the oral contract; nor, in the court's
judgment, was there any other consideration to support it.'
Counsel for the plaintiff had argued that the rule in Langenback v. Mays, namely, that "one contract may be consideration for another," 2 should be followed. The written contract
for the sale of the business would therefore provide the
1. Lefforge v. Rogers, 419 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1966).
2. Langenback v. Mays, 205 Ga. 706, 54 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1949). In an action
by a vendee on an oral promise by vendor not to compete with vendee
in the motel business, the Georgia court held that the written contract of
sale for the land in question supplied the necessary consideration to render
the oral contract enforceable.
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requisite consideration for the oral contract, found by the
trial court, and in which finding the Supreme Court acquiesced.' The court refused to enforce the oral contract
since the Langenback case dealt with a particular situation
where the written contract for the sale of property was held
to be adequate consideration for a collateral contract that
restricted the vendor from competing with the vendee."
Without discussing any other theory of consideration to
support the validity of the oral contract, agreed to have
been in existence, the court refused to enforce it for lack
of consideration.'
It is crucial in the principal case that the court accepted
the trial court's determination that there existed a separate,
oral agreement concerning the assumption of liability for the
lease of the signs. The invalidity of the oral contract was
based entirely on the court's finding that there was no consideration to render it enforceable.' Given this fact the problem becomes one of examining the facts in conjunction with
relevant theories of traditional concepts of consideration and
suggesting any theory that might have been used to support
the oral agreement.
In its determination that the written contract was not
consideration for the collateral oral agreement, the court did
not discuss a long line of cases reflected by section 83 of the
Restatement of Contracts. "Consideration is sufficient for
as many promises as are bargained for and given in exchange
for it if it would be sufficient (a) for each one of them if
that alone were bargained for .... "7 The first illustration
following this section is clearly in point. "A pays B or
promises B to pay him $5., not then owed by A, in consideration of which B promises A to give him a book and also
promises to surrender a letter. Both of B's promises are supported by sufficient consideration." 8 Clearly, it could be
3. Lefforge v. Rogers, supra note 1, at 627. "Although minds might well differ
on the facts in the case before us, it would appear that the trial court ...
was not prevented from determining . . . the oral contract was one the
parties might naturally have made." Id.
4. Langenback v. Mays, supra note 2.
5. Lefforge v. Rogers, supra note 1, at 628. "[T]here was no proof that the
execution of the written contract was consideration for the alleged oral
agreement or that there existed any other consideration for it." Id.

6. Id.

7. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 83 (1932).
8. Id.
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argued in the principal case that the plaintiff's written
promise to transfer the business supported both defendant's
written promise to buy the business and the oral promise to
assume plaintiff's liability under the existing lease?9 The
Restatement was cited in support of the decision of the Wyoming court in Long v. Forbes," enforcing an oral contract
that would be difficult to distinguish from the oral contract
in the principal case.
The context of the bilateral contract affords a second
opportunity for arguing that there was adequate consideration to support defendant's oral promise. "A bilateral contract consists of mutual promises, made in exchange for
each other by each of the two contracting parties."1 1 In
the principal case the formation of a bilateral contract would
require a finding that defendant's promise was made in
exchange for a promise by plaintiff. It is submitted that the
evidence lends itself to finding either a promise not to
insist upon the insertion of the lease in the written contract
or a promise to forbear from taking any action. In addition,
the fact that plaintiff did forbear and the signs were not
dealt with in the written contract seems to infer the existence of such promises. If the bilateral nature of the oral
contract, agreed by the court to have been in existence, is
established, consideration would be apparent at once since
mutual promises constitute sufficient consideration for a
contract."
The nature of the oral contract is also consistent with a
unilateral contract, "one in which a promise is given in
exchange for an act or forbearance."' 8 Applying this definition to the principal case it should have been contended that
defendant's promise to "get them [the sign company] off
your back" 1 was given in exchange for plaintiff's forbearance either to insist upon inclusion of the lease assignment in
9. Lefforge v. Rogers, supra note 1, at 626.
10. 58 Wyo. 533, 136 P.2d 242, 247 (1943). A written contract for employment
at $150 per month and a subsequent oral promise by the employer to
increase past salary by $50 for the months of employment were held to
be both supported by adequate consideration in the form of plaintiff's performance in reliance on the oral promise.
11. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 21, at 52 (1963).
12. Eller v. Salathe, 44 Wyo. 369, 12 P.2d 386 (1932).
13. Browning v. Johnson, 422 P.2d 314, 316 (Wash. 1967).
14. Lefforge v. Rogers, supra note 1, at 626.
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the written contract or to take some action to preclude the
breach. In the context of the unilateral contract, " ' consideration' is the price bargained for and paid for a promise, and
it is frequently defined as a 'benifit to the party promising,
or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is
made' ,.'5
In the brief for the appellant (defendant below), counsel
argued that the agreement "to relieve the plaintiff of his
obligation under the contract," was not supported by either
a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. 1"
The court failed to discuss these contentions by counsel but
such a discussion is imperative in this attempt to find a
possible theory of consideration that could have been employed by the court. In the encyclopedia definition of consideration, discussed previously, the requisite bargained-for
benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee is in
the alternative. Counsel contended no benefit inured to the
defendant by receipt of the right to deal with the sign company because he "had the right to deal with them in any
event." 17 The Wyoming court has long recognized that
"detriment and benefit, in this connection [with consideration for a contract] have a technical meaning. Neither need
be actual."'" After the agreement the promisor did have
something he would not have received but for the contractthe right to deal with this sign company for these particular
signs. This is a legal, if not actual, benefit." Equally important from the trial court record, reproduced in part in the
opinion in the principal case, it would appear that the bargain
element of consideration is also satisfied. "Mr. Lefforge
[defendant] stated that he would like to have the opportunity
to deal with the sign company himself.""0 Does this not sound
like a legal benefit bargained for, and received, in return for
his own promise to assume liability for the signs? This
bargain also goes to establish consideration on a detriment
17 C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 70, at 747 (1963).
Brief for Appellant at 25, Lefforge v. Rogers, 419 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1966).
Id.
Houghton v. Thompson, 57 Wyo. 196, 115 P.2d 654, 658 (1941).
Kansas State Inv. Co. v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 183 Kan. 190, 326 P.2d 299,
803 (1958). "Any benefit, profit or advantage flowing to promisor which
he would not have received but for the contract, or any loss or detriment
to the promisee is sufficient consideration to support the promise." Id.
20. Lefforge v. Rogers, supra note 1, at 626.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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theory. "It [detriment] means giving up something which
immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged to
keep. " Although counsel argued that" [t]here was obviously
no detriment to appellee [plaintiff below] in the case at bar
because the appellee retained possession of the signs.""
Certainly the possesion of two large signs proclaiming a business one no longer owned and a judgment for nearly four
thousand dollars are not without their detrimental features,
both actual and legal.
A final alternative theory in support of enforcing the
oral agreement is included in the very general heading of
"reliance," and is sometimes called a "substitute for con"Reliance" as a grounds for enforcing an
sideration."2
agreement is probably best reflected by section 90 of the
Restatement of Contracts: "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of
a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise."'" The probability of finding unbargainedfor reliance of a definite and substantial character within the
scope of section 90 is yet another recognized basis for enforcing the oral contract in the principal case. The Restatement
has been quoted in support by the Wyoming court 5 and fills
a need as a doctrine already implicit in the decisions." As
a substitute for consideration, this doctrine is frequently
thought to be limited to the enforceability of charitable subscriptions and has been given the narrow appellation, "promissory estoppel."" Corbin, in his work on contracts, remarks,
"The American Law Institute was well-advised in not adopting this phrase and in stating its rule in terms of action or
forbearance on the promise."" This would seem to dispel
any notion that section 90 is limited to charitable subscriptions, and not applicable in the principal case.
21. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 102A (1936).
v. Halseth, 345 P.2d 796, 799 (Wyo. 1959).
22. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16.
23.
24.

Cited with approval in Laibley

L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 61 (1965).
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).

25. Hanna State & Say. Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 77 P.2d 621, 625 (1938).
26. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 206, at 250 (1963).
27. Allegheny College v. Nat'l. Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159
N.E. 173 (1927).
28. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 204, at 234, 235 (1963).
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In conclusion, the court in the principal case limited its
discussion of finding consideration to plaintiff's single contention that the written contract supplied the consideration
for the oral agreement. Once the court accepted the trial
court's determination that the oral contract existed, a more
thorough discussion of the various concepts of traditional
consideration would have produced, if not a different result,
a much stronger case for enforcing the oral contract relied
on by the plaintiff. This 'discussion has suggested four
possibilities within traditional concepts of consideration.
Bargained-for consideration is clearly present if the written
promise to convey the business supports the oral contract.
Consideration is also very likely in the bilateral contract
setting if it is found that defendant's promise was bargainedfor and given in exchange for a promise by the plaintiff to
forbear. Within the confines of the unilateral contract,
plaintiff's bargained-for forbearance from any action on the
lease would be sufficient consideration to support defendant's
promise on either a benefit or detriment theory. Finally, the
so-called "promissory estoppel" doctrine would be the basis
of enforcing the contract if it is found that plaintiff's detrimental reliance was unbargained-for within the scope of
section 90 of the Restatement.
ROBERT C. HANSCUM
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